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What	might	be	behind	Trump’s	tariffs	on	steel
imports?
Last	Thursday	President	Trump	acted	to	impose	25	per	cent	tariffs	on	steel	and	10	per	cent	tariffs	on	aluminium.	This
action	followed	an	investigation	under	Section	232	of	the	1962	US	Trade	Expansion	Act	by	the	US	Commerce
Department	of	whether	imports	were	endangering	US	national	security.	The	European	Union’s	response	to	this
action,	and	that	of	other	WTO	members,	should	be	to	defend	the	rules-based	order	against	what	appears	to	be	a
challenge	from	the	US	President	and	to	seek	cooperative	solutions	to	the	structural	imbalances	in	international	steel
markets.
What	might	be	the	US	aims?
The	difficulty	the	EU	has	in	deciding	how	to	respond	to	the	US	action	is	that	neither	the	ultimate	objective(s)	of	the
President’s	action,	nor	its	basis	in	trade	law	is	clear.
The	possible	objectives	are:
To	protect	the	US	steel	and	aluminium	industries	from	import	competition	as	with	similar	action	by	President
Bush	in	2003.	This	would	be	on	top	of	the	many	existing	anti-dumping	and	other	measures	already	in	place	to
protect	US	steel;
To	pursue	domestic	political	objectives	by	acting	on	an	election	pledge	to	do	something	for	the	steel	workers
and	the	communities	affected	by	structural	change	in	the	sector;
To	‘claim	value’,	as	it	is	termed	in	negotiation	theory,	to	pressurize	US	trading	partners	to	make	concessions	or
renegotiate	agreements	(NAFTA).	There	also	appears	to	be	an	aim	to	‘do	something’	–	it	is	not	clear	what	–	to
reduce	the	US	trade	deficit	with	the	EU	or	Germany	in	particular;	or
To	protect	US	national	security.
Considering	these	possible	objectives,	if	the	aim	were	simply	to	protect	the	steel	industry	the	US	could	have	initiated
a	safeguard	action	as	envisaged	under	Article	XIX	of	the	GATT	1994.	True,	it	might	well	have	lost	the	case	in	the
WTO	as	President	Bush	did	in	2003.	But	WTO	cases	take	time	and	during	this	time	the	US	steel	industry	could	have
some	temporary	relief.
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The	safeguard	would	also	satisfy	the	political	objective	of	President	Trump	to	be	seen	to	be	doing	something	for	the
steel	industry.	Given	the	costs	of	tariffs	for	US	steel	consuming	industries,	a	more	economically	rational	policy	would
have	been	to	provide	adjustment	assistance	for	the	sustainable	development	of	steel	producing	areas	(retraining,
local	regional	development	and	financial	support)	and	promote	a	modernisation	of	the	US	steel	industry.	But	such
active	structural	policies	in	response	to	changes	brought	about	by	trade	are	seldom	if	ever	considered	these	days.
The	case	for	action	set	out	in	the	Section	232	investigation	by	the	Department	of	Commerce	appears	to	be	based	on
the	view	that	any	reduction	in	the	existing	production	capacity	would	damage	US	national	security.	This	is	less	than
compelling	when	capacity	is	at	around	96	million	metric	tonnes	(mmt),	demand	a	little	over	100	mmt	and	most	steel
imports	affected	by	the	tariffs	come	from	US	allies.	The	national	security	justification	however,	serves	two	purposes.
It	provides	the	US	with	discretion	to	act	on	imports	and	threatens	to	undermine	the	WTO.	To	date	WTO	members
have	avoided	claiming	the	right	to	act	in	the	interests	of	the	national	security	exception	under	Article	XXI	of	the
GATT,	because	extensive	use	of	such	broad	discretionary	powers	would	fundamentally	weaken	the	rules-based
system.
This	leaves	the	value-claiming	objective.	The	Trump	Administration	has	already	exercised	such	leverage	vis-à-vis
Canada	and	Mexico	and	President	Trump	has	linked	the	trade	sanctions	with	German	contributions	to	NATO	and	the
scale	of	the	German	trade	surplus	with	the	USA.	So	the	idea	of	acting	tough	to	get	a	better	deal	in	a	number	of	areas
where	President	Trump	feels	the	US	has	gotten	a	bad	deal	seems	to	have	something	of	a	ring	of	truth	in	it.
So	how	should	the	EU	and	others	respond?
The	initial	EU	response	was	to	follow	the	approach	used	in	2003	on	the	assumption	that	the	US	action	could	be	seen
as	a	safeguard.	This	would	enable	the	EU	to	threaten	and	ultimately	impose	compensation,	in	other	words	increase
tariffs	on	a	range	of	US	exports	under	Article	8	of	the	WTO	Safeguards	Agreement.	The	EU	could	then	also
challenge	the	US	action	in	the	WTO	with	the	hope	and	expectation	of	winning	as	in	2003.	The	targeting	of	particular
US	exports,	a	well-established	practice	in	such	cases,	would	also	drive	home	the	domestic	costs	for	the	US	of
protecting	steel	and	aluminium.
In	its	response	to	measures	based	on	national	security,	the	EU	faces	a	dilemma.	If	the	US	claims	the	right	to	take
what	would	be	in	effect	discretionary	trade	protection	under	the	national	security	exception	in	GATT	Art	XXI,	the	EU
could	of	course	challenge	this	in	the	WTO.	But	if	the	US	were	to	win	it	would	be	open	season	for	any	government	–
including	the	US	–	wishing	to	follow	suit,	with	the	inherent	risk	of	a	tariff	war	and	a	downward	spiral	in	trade.	If,	on	the
other	hand,	the	US	were	to	lose,	the	rhetoric	would	be	‘WTO	undermines	US	national	security’.	Something	that	could
further	undermine	US	support	for	a	rules-based	trading	system.	This	dilemma	is	the	reason	all	governments	have
avoided	the	Article	XXI	exception	in	all	but	rare	cases	such	as	UN	based	economic	sanctions.	So,	by	playing	the
national	security	card	the	Trump	Administration	threatens	the	stability	of	the	WTO	whatever	the	outcome.
If	the	US	aim	is	pure	value-claiming	to	gain	leverage	by	threatening	trade	sanctions,	the	EU	and	all	those	WTO
members	that	wish	to	defend	a	rules-based,	open	trading	system	should	decline	any	offers	to	reach	a	deal.	In
seeking	a	WTO-consistent	response,	the	EU	might	consider	other	options	such	as	bringing	an	Article	XXIII	(so-called
non-violation)	case	again	the	US.	This	enables	compensation	without	venturing	onto	the	thin	ice	of	a	dispute	on	the
interpretation	of	Article	XXI.
At	the	same	time	the	EU	should	be	ready	to	defend	the	European	steel	industry	if	exports	destined	for	the	US	are
redirected	towards	the	EU	market	in	sufficient	volumes	to	threaten	injury	to	the	EU	industry.	This	can	be	done	fairly
promptly	by	means	of	provision	safeguard	measures	under	Article	XIX	of	the	GATT.
The	EU	should	also	continue	to	promote	international	cooperation	in	addressing	the	structural	imbalances	in	the
steel	sector.	Talks	on	cooperation	on	steel	are	on-going	in	the	Global	Steel	Forum	set	up	at	the	G20	Hangzhou
summit	in	2017	and	are	facilitated	by	the	OECD.	Such	an	approach	has	been	used	before	in	cases	of	structural
surplus	capacity.	These	involved	a	combination	of	commitments	to	reduce	surplus	capacity,	efforts	to	control
subsidies	and	measures	to	promote	structural	adjustment	and	provide	support	for	the	workers	and	communities
affected	by	closures.
♣♣♣
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Featured	image	credit:	President	Trump	applauded	by	steel	executives,	official	White	House	photo	by	Shealah
Craighead,	under	a	CC-BY-3.0	US	licence
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